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Abstract
Almost all the literature on tax competition in the presence of multina-
tionals (MNCs) ignores the combined e¤ect of pro…t shifting and economic
integration (i.e., a reduction in trade costs) on equilibrium capital taxes. In
this paper we set up a two-country model with trade costs to analyze the re-
lationship between economic integration and equilibrium taxes. We …nd that
economic integration leads to higher equilibrium tax rates for su¢ciently low
levels of trade costs if multinationals are owned by home country residents.
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1 Introduction
A prominent feature of what is often referred to as internationalization is the strong
growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) throughout the world with surges in annual
growth rates of 25 and 32 percent in the late 80s and 90s. This trend has been
accompanied by a rise in trade between a¢liates of multinationals located in di¤erent
countries to the extent that about 33 percent of world trade was intra-…rm trade in
1993 (Markusen (2002, ch1)).
The rising importance of multinationals and intra-…rm trade in the world econ-
omy has at least three implications for the corporate tax base: (1) pro…ts incurred
in a given country may not be received by domestic residents; (2) a larger share
of corporate income in any given country will stem from activities by a¢liates of
foreign multinationals; (3) the corporate tax base becomes more sensitive to inter-
national di¤erences in tax rates. The …rst point indicates that internationalization
entails more international ownership of …rms. The second and third points, contrary
to popular belief, do not necessarily pertain to the choices made by multinationals
as to where they undertake FDI, but to the fact that the sheer volume of intra-…rm
trade allows multinationals to shift pro…ts to low tax countries by under- or over-
invocing intra-…rm transactions. Empirical evidence on the importance of income
shifting and transfer pricing is well documented (see e.g. Weichenrieder (1996),
Hines (1999), and Gresik (2001)). The problem posed by pro…t shifting for the …scal
autonomy of countries seemingly depends on the volume of trade and thus trade
costs, since a substantial part of intra-…rm trade is in goods where arm’s length
prices are not easily established (see Markusen (2002, ch1.)).
The literature on tax competition in the presence of multinationals that is of
relevance to this paper can be divided into two. The …rst set of papers stud-
ies how transfer pricing a¤ects tax policy. Mansori and Weichenrieder (2001) and
Raimondos-Møller and Scharf (2002) model transfer pricing regulations by two gov-
ernments and investigate how transfer pricing a¤ects equilibrium tax rates. Elitzur
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and Mintz (1996) discuss corporate tax competition under alternative transfer pric-
ing rules when transfer pricing a¤ects managerial incentives as well as the overall
tax payment. Hau‡er and Schjelderup (2000) investigate the optimal taxation of
corporate pro…ts when governments can choose both the tax rate and the base of the
corporate tax, and multinationals shift pro…ts by transfer pricing. Finally, Smart
and Mintz (2001) study corporate income taxation when …rms operating in multiple
jurisdictions can shift income by using …nancial planning strategies. Most of these
papers embed trade explicitly, but none of them incorporates the e¤ect of economic
integration, in terms of reduced trade costs, on the outcome of their analysis. The
second set of papers ignores transfer pricing, but examines how the structure of
ownership a¤ects tax policy in the presence of multinationals. A benchmark result
is that increased foreign ownership leads to higher equilibrium taxes. As shown by
Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) and more recently by Olsen and Osmundsen (2001)
in a setting of asymmetric information, the rise in taxes can be explained by the
incentive to shift part of the tax burden on to foreigners.
The purpose of this paper is to bridge the gap between the two strands of lit-
erature by developing a model of tax competition in the presence of multinationals
and pro…t shifting, where the corporate tax base is partly foreign owned and the tax
base endogenously determined by the tax rates set by each government. Moreover,
we aim at answering one major question that so far has been left unresolved: How
does economic integration, here taken to imply a reduction in trade barriers, a¤ect
equilibrium taxes? To answer this question we use a two-country model with trade
costs, and assume for simplicity that each country is host to a multinational …rm
(henceforth MNC) producing a single consumer good. The two MNCs serve their
home markets, but also export goods to their foreign sales o¢ces unless trade costs
are too high. Each government sets taxes so as to maximize national welfare, taking
into consideration the strategic choices of the multinationals and their ability to
shift pro…ts. We demonstrate that a reduction in trade barriers between countries
reduces taxes in the tax competition equilibrium if MNCs are owned by residents of
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a foreign country, while it increases equilibrium taxes if MNCs are owned by home
country residents.1 .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the modelling framework,
while section 3 explores the impact of economic integration on equilibrium tax rates.
Section 4 addresses the issue of international cross ownership and the interaction
between cross ownership structures, economic integration and tax rates. Finally,
section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 The modelling framework
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between economic integra-
tion, corporate taxation, and transfer pricing of multinational corporations (MNCs).
We therefore abstract from MNCs’ localization decisions, i.e. the decision of whether
or not to set up an a¢liate abroad, and employ a model that has two identical coun-
tries, A and B, and two identical multinational companies.2 Multinational company
MNCi has headquarters with production facilities in country i and a sales o¢ce in
country j (i 6= j). Part of the production in country i is sold in country i and the
rest is exported to the sales o¢ce in country j: Domestic and foreign pro…ts before
tax for MNCi are equal to ¼ii and ¼ij; respectively, where the …rst subscript indi-
cates where the headquarters are located and the second where pro…ts are derived.
Aggregate pro…t before tax for MNCi is ¼i = ¼ii + ¼ij (i; j = A;B; i 6= j).
The MNCs produce homogenous goods, and face the inverse demand curve
pi = 1¡ xii ¡ xji; (1)
1Home country refers to the country where the MNC’s parent company is located.
2 In some industries the long-run localization pattern of multinational companies may partly
be determined by tax incentives (e.g. for export-oriented MNCs) and partly by access to speci…c
factors of production. Our focus, however, is on MNCs where the foreign subsidiaries are primarily
set up to serve local markets, and we therefore treat the number of MNCs and a¢liates in each
country as exogenous.
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Figure 1: Figure 1: The model
where pi is the price in country i; and xii and xji denote quantities supplied by the
domestic and foreign MNC, respectively. Without any e¤ect on the main conclusions
of this analysis we assume for simplicity that marginal costs of production are equal
to zero.
The foreign sales o¢ce of each MNC is charged gi for each unit that it buys
from its parent. Since marginal costs are zero, it follows that the transfer price
is higher (lower) than true production costs if gi > 0 (gi < 0): In addition to the
transfer price, the foreign a¢liate must also pay a trade cost ¿ ¸ 0 for each unit it
receives from its headquarters. We emphasize that trade costs in our setting should
be interpreted as a synthetic measure of a wide range of barriers to trade including
transport costs, costs of frontier formalities, and di¤ering product standards. We do
not consider income generating tari¤s, as these are typically of limited importance
in the trade between industrialized countries. The model is illustrated in Figure 1.
The transfer price is potentially an instrument that the MNCs can use to shift
pro…t from one country to the other in order to save taxes. It is assumed that the
good is specialized, so that the true cost of exporting cannot be directly observed by
tax authorities. But, in line with most of the literature on transfer pricing we make
the realistic assumption that it is costly to conceal deviations in the transfer price
from the true cost of production. More speci…cally, we assume that the concealment
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cost function is strictly convex, and equal to Ci = ±g2i xij so it is equally expensive
to manipulate the transfer price upwards as downwards: This assumption can be
interpreted either as an increased probability of detection by the tax authorities
(see, e.g. Kant, 1988) or as costs that need to be incurred in order to conceal the
true price of the product for example by hiring of lawyers or accountants (see, e.g.,
Hau‡er and Schjelderup, 2000).3
We can now express pro…t before taxes as
¼ii = pixii + gixij ¡ ±g2i xij; (2)
while the pro…t level of the foreign plant equals
¼ij = (pj ¡ ¿ ¡ gi)xij: (3)
Total pro…ts for MNCi before taxes are thus
¼i = ¼ii + ¼ij = pixii ¡ ±g2i xij + (pj ¡ ¿ )xij; (4)
and this equation shows that manipulation of the transfer price is intrinsically waste-
ful.
We assume that the countries use separate accounting as foundation for their
corporate tax system, i.e. each country imposes a tax on the pro…ts generated
within its borders. The aim of this tax code is to identify the precise receipts
and expenditures attributable to the corporation’s activities in each jurisdiction.
Although repatriated pro…ts in principle are taxed in the country of residence, there
is general agreement that due to deferral possibilities and limited tax credit rules,
the source principle of taxation is e¤ectively in operation in most OECD countries
(Keen, 1993, and Tanzi and Bovenberg, 1990). Taking this into account, global after
tax pro…ts of a multinational …rm with headquarters in country i are
¦i = (1¡ ti)¼ii + (1¡ tj)¼ij: (5)
3The latter interpretation implies that tax authorities may not even know that these costs are
related to transfer pricing decisions by the multinational.
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We consider a game with two stages. In the …rst stage the two countries simul-
taneously set their tax rates, tA and tB: In the second stage the headquarters set
the transfer prices to their foreign a¢liates, and compete á-lá Cournot in the two
segmented end-user markets.
Stage 2: In the second stage, the multinational …rm with its parent company
in country i maximizes (5) with respect to xii; xij and gi; taking the quantities
supplied by the other multinational …rm (i.e., MNCj) and the tax rates as given.
Using equations (1), (2) and (3) we …nd that di¤erentiating (5) with respect to gi
gives
@¦i
@gi
= 0 =) gi = tj ¡ ti2±(1 ¡ ti) ; (6)
which shows that MNCi wants to underinvoice its exports (gi < 0) and shift pro…ts
to country j if ti > tj. Similarly, an incentive for overinvoicing arises when ti < tj:
We further see that the …rm will shift all pro…ts to the low-tax country if it is costless
to manipulate the transfer price (± = 0), whilst it will set the transfer price equal to
marginal cost if it is prohibitively costly to manipulate the transfer price (± ! 1);
or if ti = tj (in which case no pro…t shifting motive exists). Note that the transfer
price is independent of trade cost, ¿:
Di¤erentiating (5) with respect to xii and xij we obtain the …rst order conditions
for xii and xij. Solving this simultaneously for the two MNCs and using (6), allow
us to derive the following expressions for home sales and exports:
@¦i
@xii
= 0 =) xii = 1+ ¿3 ¡
1
12
(ti ¡ tj)2
± (1 ¡ ti) (1¡ tj) , (7)
@¦i
@xij
= 0 =) xij = 1 ¡ 2¿3 +
1
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(ti ¡ tj)2
± (1¡ ti) (1¡ tj): (8)
Since the …rm can always choose to set gi = 0; the marginal pro…t of exports for
…rm i is higher when it can manipulate the transfer price (± < 1) as opposed to
when it is unable to do so (i.e., when ± = 1). Thus, we may state:
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Lemma 1: When ± 2 [0;1) and ti 6= tj; …rm i sets gi 6= 0 and exports more
than if it were prohibitively costly to engage in transfer pricing (i.e., ± = 1; gi = 0).
Proof : See the Appendix.
Equations (7) and (8) show that a decrease in trade costs (¿ ) increases exports
and thus import competition, and as a result, domestic sales fall. If it is prohibitively
expensive to manipulate the transfer prices (±! 1) or if the countries levy the same
taxes (ti = tj) we have that4
x¤ii =
1 + ¿
3
; and x¤ij =
1 ¡ 2¿
3
; (9)
which means that equilibrium quantities (denoted by an asterix) are independent
of tax rates. This result is a variation of the well-known result in public …nance
stating that if true pro…ts equal taxable pro…ts, the distortionary e¤ect of the tax
vanishes. The usefulness of this property in the symmetric equilibrium will become
clear later.
Stage 1: At the …rst stage each government sets its tax rate in order to maximize
national welfare, taking the taxes of the other country as given. In order to see
how the tax equilibrium is a¤ected by various ownership constellations we de…ne
® 2 [0; 1] as the share of each multinational that is owned by domestic residents.
The residual (1¡ ®) is owned by residents of a third country. Welfare in country i
is given by
Wi = Ti +®¦i + CSi;
where CSi is consumer surplus in country i. We note that tax income equals Ti =
ti(¼ii + ¼ji) and that ¦i = (1 ¡ ti)¼ii + (1 ¡ tj)¼ij; which allows us to rewrite the
expression for welfare as
Wi = ® (¼ii + ¼ij)| {z }
(I)
¡ ®tj¼ij| {z }
(II)
+ ti¼ji + (1 ¡ ®) ti¼ii| {z }
(III)
+ CSi: (10)
4Notice that there will be no trade if ¿ ¸ 1=2:
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The …rst term in equation (10) is the pro…t ownership e¤ect (I), which shows
that welfare in country i depends positively on the pre-tax rent that the domestic
residents receive from MNCi. The next two terms depend directly on the tax
rates that the countries impose, and following the literature in public economics we
label these terms the foreign tax exporting externality e¤ect (II) and the home tax
exporting externality e¤ect (III).5 In general, tax-exporting externalities may occur
in tax competition games where residents of one country earn some rents in another
country. Each country will then have incentives to use the tax policy to capture
some of these rents at the expense of other countries. In equation (10) two tax
exporting externalities arise. The foreign tax exporting externality e¤ect (II) arises
because country j has an incentive to tax the pro…t that MNCj makes in country i:
This e¤ect has a negative impact on welfare in country i: The home tax exporting
externality (III) arises because country i can use taxes to shift some of the rents
derived by foreign residents to the treasury of country i: Speci…cally, country i can
tax foreigners through two channels; either by taxing the foreign a¢liate located in
country i (i.e., ¼ji); or by taxing the foreign share of the pro…ts of MNCi (that is,
(1 ¡ ®)¼ii):
From equations (7) and (8) we …nd that @x¤ii=@tijti=tj = @x¤ji=@ti
¯¯
ti=tj
= 0 in the
symmetric equilibrium. Thus, a small increase in the tax rates from a symmetric
equilibrium will not have any e¤ect on supplied quantities, and thereby no e¤ect
on consumer surplus. Hence, taxation only a¤ects welfare through (I)-(III): From
(10) it is apparent that the relative magnitudes of the three terms depend on the
ownership structure (®). If MNCi is entirely owned by domestic residents (® = 1);
then national welfare depends on MNCi’s pro…ts, the foreign tax exporting e¤ect,
and the taxing of the foreign a¢liate of MNCj. In contrast, if MNCi is entirely
owned by third country residents (® = 0); terms (I) and (II) vanish, and the e¤ect of
tax policy on welfare is entirely determined by the degree to which the government
5The labelling is a slight abuse of language, since the externalities turn up in the …rst-order
conditions and not in the welfare expression as such.
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can tax the foreign a¢liate ofMNCj and third country shareholders ofMNCi (i.e.,
e¤ect (III)):
The government in country i maximizes (10) with respect to ti, taking tj as
given. In the appendix we show that in the symmetric equilibrium @¼¤ii=@ti =
¡@¼¤ij=@ti: This result implies that the impact of taxes on term (I) is zero. Invoking
symmetry conditions on the …rst order conditions and de…ning t¤ ´ t¤A = t¤B in
the symmetric equilibrium; the solution to the government’s maximization problem
gives equilibrium tax rate
t¤ = ±
(2¡ 2¿ + 5¿2)¡ ® (1 + ¿)2
(2¡ 2¿ + 5¿ 2) ± + 3¡ 6¿ ¡ ±® (1 + ¿ )2 : (11)
From equation (11) it is straightforward to show that an increase in the foreign
ownership of …rms (d® < 0), other things being equal, a¤ects the equilibrium tax
rate as follows
dt¤
¡d® = ¡
3± (1¡ 2¿) (1 + ¿ )2¡
(2 ¡ 2¿ +5¿ 2) ± +3 ¡ 6¿ ¡ ±® (1 + ¿)2¢2 > 0: (12)
Equation (12) replicates the benchmark result in the literature (e.g., Huizinga and
Nielsen (1997)) that the equilibrium tax rate increases when the foreign ownership
share rises. The interpretation of this result is that the larger the share of the
corporate tax base owned by residents of a third country, the greater is the share
of the tax burden that can be shifted onto foreigners. Put di¤erently, the more
important the home tax exporting e¤ect (III); the stronger is the incentive to raise
the tax rate.
We now turn to examine how economic integration, taken to imply a reduction
in trade barriers, a¤ects the equilibrium tax rate - a question that, to our knowledge,
has never before been examined in the tax competition literature.
3 Economic integration and equilibrium taxes
In order to investigate how the equilibrium tax rate is a¤ected by economic inte-
gration it is convenient …rst to consider two special cases; one where MNCi is fully
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owned by residents of country i and one where both multinationals are owned by
residents of a third country.
Domestic ownership (® = 1) We start by analyzing the case where MNCi is
fully owned by residents of country i; in which case welfare can be written as
Wi = (¼ii + ¼ij)| {z }
(I)
¡ tj¼ij|{z}
(II)
+ ti¼ji|{z}+CSi
(III)
(13)
Recall that in the symmetric equilibrium CS¤i is independent of taxes, and the
net impact of taxes on the term (I) is zero. Di¤erentiating equation (13) with respect
to ti yields
@W ¤i
@ti
= t¤x¤ij
@g¤i
@ti| {z }
@(II)=@ti
¡
·
t¤x¤ji
@g¤j
@ti
¡ ¼¤ji
¸
| {z }
@(III)=@ti
= 0: (14)
Before we discuss (14), it is useful to keep in mind that an increase in ti induces
MNCi and MNCj to shift pro…ts to country j by under and overinvocing exports,
respectively. The …rst term in (14) shows that a higher ti induces MNCi to reduce
its transfer price by @g¤i =@ti per unit that it exports to its a¢liate in country j: The
e¤ect is to increase ¼¤ij, thus allowing the foreign country to export more of its taxes
to residents of country i. The last term in (14) is the change in country i’s ability
to shift tax burdens onto foreigners and consists of two e¤ects: (a) The rise in ti
induces the foreign MNCj to increase its transfer price by @g¤j=@ti > 0 per unit on
the goods it exports to its a¢liate in country i: This lowers ¼¤ji and reduces the scope
for taxing foreigners. (b) A higher tax rate in country i - for constant transfer price
- allows country i to tax pro…ts derived by foreigners harder, thus increasing welfare.
To sum up, the pro…t shifting e¤ect following an increase in ti has a detrimental
impact on welfare in country i, while the direct e¤ect on tax revenue has a positive
welfare e¤ect. By substituting the equilibrium values of @g¤i =@t¤i and @g¤j=@t¤i and
using symmetry (t¤i = t¤) in (14) we can express the welfare e¤ects more explicitly
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as
@W ¤i
@ti
= ¡
µ
1¡ 2¿
3
¶µ
1
± (1¡ t¤)
¶
| {z }
pro…t shifting
+
µ
1 ¡ 2¿
3
¶2
| {z }
direct revenue e¤ect
= 0: (15)
In equation (15) we have grouped the detrimental e¤ects of pro…t shifting on
welfare in the …rst term, and the direct e¤ects on tax revenue from levying a higher
tax on foreigners in the second term. From the …rst term of (15) we see that a
reduction in trade costs increases the amount of pro…ts shifted away from country i:
This reduces the scope for home tax exporting, and increases tax exporting by the
foreign country. The second term re‡ects the fact that economic integration increases
the foreign a¢liate’s market share and thus its pro…ts in country i; thereby allowing
country i to export more of its tax burden to the foreign …rm. Intuitively, since the
pro…t shifting implies a loss of tax base it suggests that t¤is decreasing when trade
costs (¿ ) fall, while the direct revenue e¤ect points to a bene…t of raising t¤ when
trade costs are reduced. From (15) we derive explicit expressions for the equilibrium
tax rate and the impact of economic integration:
t¤j®=1 = ± 1 ¡ 2¿3 + ±(1¡ 2¿) ; and
d t¤j®=1
d¿
= ¡6 ±
[3 + ±(1¡ 2¿)]2 < 0 (16)
which allows us to state:
Proposition 1: Economic integration increases the equilibrium corporate tax
rate (t¤) if MNCA and MNCB are fully owned by residents of country A and B;
respectively.
The reason for the rise in equilibrium tax rates is that the direct revenue e¤ect
dominates the pro…t shifting e¤ect. From (16) it can further be seen that as trade
costs (¿ ) go to zero and the maximum tax level is reached, the equilibrium tax rate
is a function of the mobility of the tax base (±) only, that is, t¤ = ±=(3 + ±): Hence,
the more mobile the tax base (i.e., the lower is ±) the lower is the equilibrium tax
rate.
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Foreign ownership (® = 0) When the multinationals are owned by residents of
a third country, welfare in country i is given by
Wi = CSi + ti¼ji + ti¼ii| {z }
(III)
: (17)
It is useful to note that in this case corporate income is fully received by foreigners
so only the home tax exporting e¤ect remains. This e¤ect is now made up by pro…ts
of the foreign a¢liate of MNCj located in country i; and the parent company of
MNCi: Since all corporate income derived in country i is earned by foreigners, the
tax exporting incentive suggests that a tax rate of 100 percent should be applied.
However, such a rate would trigger transfer pricing and thus a reduction in ¼¤ji and
¼¤ii: Country i must therefore balance the incentive to shift taxes onto foreigners
against a potential loss of tax revenue from pro…t shifting. Di¤erentiating equation
(17) gives
@W ¤i
@ti
= ¡t¤x¤ji
@g¤j
@ti
+ t¤x¤ij
@g¤i
@ti
+ ¼¤ji + ¼
¤
ii| {z }
@(III)=@ti
= 0 (18)
There are four terms in (18). The two last terms re‡ect the direct tax revenue
e¤ect of raising the tax rate, while the two …rst terms are the change in taxable
pro…ts due to pro…t shifting. In order to see how these e¤ects depend on trade costs
we substitute and obtain,
@W ¤i
@ti
= ¡
µ
1¡ 2¿
3
¶ µ
1
± (1 ¡ t¤)
¶
| {z }
pro…t shi…ting
+
µ
1 ¡ 2¿
3
¶2
+
µ
1 + ¿
3
¶2
| {z }
direct revenue e¤ect
= 0: (19)
The …rst term is the e¤ect of pro…t shifting on tax revenue. As before, it is
negative, indicating that as trade costs fall, more pro…ts will be shifted following
a tax increase. The direct revenue e¤ect is in turn made up of two terms, which
re‡ects that trade cost reduction increases the market share of the foreign a¢liate
(¼¤ji) and reduces the market share of the domestically based MNCi (¼¤ii). The total
e¤ect on tax revenue is negative, since allowing trade implies that the monopoly
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pro…ts of MNCi are replaced by duopoly pro…ts. Taken together, both e¤ects – the
pro…ts and the direct revenue e¤ect – therefore suggest that tax rates should fall in
equilibrium if trade costs fall. This is con…rmed by solving (19) with respect to the
equilibrium tax rate,
t¤j®=0 = ± 2 ¡ ¿ (2¡ 5¿)(2¡ 2¿ + 5¿2)± + 3¡ 6¿ ;
and (20)
d t¤j®=0
d¿
= 6± 1 + 5¿(1 ¡ ¿)
[(2 ¡ 2¿ + 5¿2) ± +3 ¡ 6¿ ]2 > 0:
We have:
Proposition 2: Economic integration reduces the equilibrium corporate tax rate
(t¤) if MNCA and MNCB are fully owned by residents of a third country.
It is useful to note that the result obtained in Proposition 2 is the opposite of
that in Proposition 1. Figure 2 provides a numerical example (with ± = 10) to
illustrate these results. The curve labelled ® = 0 shows how the tax rate declines as
trade costs fall when both multinationals are owned by residents of a third country
(cf. Proposition 2). It conveys that economic integration reduces the tax base due
to import competition and transfer pricing. The curve labelled ® = 1 illustrates
Proposition 1. The slope re‡ects the fact that when MNCi is fully owned by do-
mestic residents, economic integration increases the equilibrium tax rate, since it
enhances the pro…ts earned by the foreign MNCj in country i; and thus the tax
base of country i. Finally, we see that taxes are higher when multinationals are
owned by residents of a third country (® = 0) than by domestic residents (® = 1 ),
c.f. also equation (12). Note, however, that the di¤erence in equilibrium tax rates
due to di¤erences in ownership structure (® = 0 and ® = 1) diminishes as trade
barriers fall.
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Figure 2: Economic integration and its e¤ect on the equilibrium corporate tax t¤
Figure 2 does not tell us anything about the relationship between economic
integration and equilibrium taxes for ® 2 (0; 1), since economic integration leads
to a higher tax rate if ® = 1 and a lower tax rate if ® = 0: To examine the
relationship between ¿ and t¤ for ® 2 (0; 1); consider …rst the case where trade
costs are prohibitively high (¿ ¸ 1=2). From equation (16) we then know that the
equilibrium tax rate is equal to zero (t¤ = 0) if ® = 1: However, this is a knife-
edge result. To see this, suppose that at least a tiny part of the multinationals are
owned by residents of a third country (® < 1). Any positive tax rate is then a pure
tax on foreigners, making it optimal to set t¤ = 1: The reason for this is that the
multinationals cannot use the transfer price to shift pro…ts between the countries
when trade is prohibitively expensive. Moreover, it must be optimal to set the
tax rate close to unity also if trade costs are somewhat lower than 1=2: Nonetheless,
economic integration means that the tax bases become more sensitive to tax changes
as the scope for pro…t shifting through transfer pricing increases. A reduction of ¿
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therefore reduces the equilibrium tax rate in the neighborhood of ¿ = 1=2 for all
® 2 [0; 1): This is shown for ® = 0:1 and ® = 0:9 in Figure 3.
Though economic integration unambiguously reduces equilibrium taxes for high
levels of trade costs, Figure 3 illustrates that the same is not true for low levels of
trade costs. In particular, we see that the curve labelled ® = 0:9 is U-shaped. The
intuition for this result is that it is particularly important to tax the export pro…t of
the foreign multinational if ® is high and ¿ is low - the latter follows from the fact
that export pro…ts are larger the lower the level of trade costs. With initially low
trade costs we thus …nd that further economic integration increases the equilibrium
tax rate. This is consistent with Proposition 1. If ® is small, on the other hand, we
have a result which is consistent with Proposition 2; economic integration leads to
lower equilibrium tax rates for all levels of trade costs. More precisely, we have the
following result:
Proposition 3: Economic integration increases the equilibrium tax rate for
su¢ciently low levels of trade costs if ® > 1=2; otherwise economic integration
reduces the tax rate.
Proof : See the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Consequences of economic integration for di¤erent values of ®:
4 International cross-ownership
The discussion above suggests that economic integration may lead to higher or
lower tax rates in the tax equilibrium depending on who owns the corporate tax
base. To explore the impact of di¤erent ownership structures further, and test the
robustness of our results, we consider a di¤erent ownership structure which allows
cross-ownership in the sense that consumers in country i own a share ¯ of MNCi
and a share (1 ¡ ¯) of MNCj: Likewise, consumers in country j own a share ¯ of
MNCj and a share (1 ¡ ¯) of MNCi: The welfare function of country i can be
expressed by
Wi = CSi + (¼ii + ¼ij) ¡ ¯tj¼ij + (1¡ ¯)ti¼ii ¡ (1¡ ¯)tj¼jj + ¯ti¼ji: (21)
As before, the welfare function contains a tax base term and home and foreign tax
exporting terms. It is straightforward to derive the equilibrium tax rate as
t¤ = ±
(1 + ¿ )2 ¡ (6¡ 3¿) ¯¿
(1 + ¿)2 ± + 3¡ 6¿ ¡ (6 ¡ 3¿ ) ±¯¿ (22)
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Again we can illustrate how the equilibrium tax rate is a¤ected by changes in own-
ership structure and trade costs. This is done in Figure 4. It shows that increased
international cross-ownership, implying that residents of country i increase their
share inMNCj while residents in country j increase their share in MNCi, portrays
the same relationship between taxes and trade costs as increased foreign ownership
by third country residents in the previous section. However, there is one notable ex-
ception: with free trade (¿ = 0) the degree of foreign ownership; which was decisive
for the equilibrium tax rate in the previous section, does not matter any more: the
equilibrium tax rate is t¤ = ±=(3 + ±) and thus identical to the equilibrium tax rate
when ® = 1: Free trade means that each multinational’s foreign a¢liate contributes
just as much to tax revenue as the parent …rm of the local MNC. Free trade more-
over implies that whether residents of a country own 50 percent of each MNC, or
100 percent of one and zero of the other, is irrelevant for their income.
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Figure 4: International cross ownership.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the outcome of corporate tax competition when
governments set taxes to maximize national welfare, taking into consideration the
strategic choices of the multinational …rms. The aim has been to investigate how
economic integration, taken to imply a reduction of trade barriers between coun-
tries, a¤ects equilibrium tax rates. The major result that emerges is that economic
integration may lead to an increase in the equilibrium tax rate for su¢ciently low
levels of trade costs if the multinationals are partly owned by domestic residents and
partly by foreigners. Moreover the equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the share of
foreign ownership of the multinationals for all levels of trade costs, .
Our results have a profound implication for one’s view on the outcome of com-
petition over corporate income. In the tax competition literature the main message
is that tax competition will lead to a downward pressure on capital tax rates (see
Wilson (1999) for a survey). Our analysis predicts that the rising importance of
multinationals combined with increased foreign ownership of …rms, may dampen
and even give rise to higher tax rates as economic integration proceeds. If anything,
empirical results give some support to this conclusion in the sense that corporate
tax revenues have not fallen over the years either as a share of GDP or as a share of
total tax revenue (see Chennels and Gri¢th (1997) and Bond and Chennels (2000)).
One feature that our model does not encompass is the competition among coun-
tries to attract FDI. Intuitively, this e¤ect should be qualitatively similar to the
pro…t shifting e¤ect. Whether the inclusion of this e¤ect within a similar model
framework would change our results, is a task for future research.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The …rst order conditions for MNCi are
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@¼i
@xii
= 1¡ 2xii ¡ xji = 0; (23)
@¼i
@xij
= (1 ¡ ti)(gi ¡ ±g2i ) + (1 ¡ tj)(1 ¡ 2xij ¡xjj ¡ ¿ ¡ gi) = 0: (24)
Suppose that ti 6= tj: By using equation (6) for gi we can then express the latter
…rst-order condition as
@¼i
@xij
= (1¡ti)( tj ¡ ti2±(1¡ ti)¡±
µ
tj ¡ ti
2±(1¡ ti)
¶2
)+(1¡tj)(1¡2xij¡xjj¡¿¡ tj ¡ ti2±(1¡ ti) ):
(25)
If the …rm is unable to manipulate the transfer price we know from equation (24)
that 1¡ 2x¤ij ¡ x¤jj ¡ ¿ = 0: Inserting this into (24) we have
@¼i
@xij
= 1
4
(tj ¡ ti)2
± (1 ¡ ti) > 0 for ti 6= tj and ± < 1:
The …rm will choose to increase xij until the marginal pro…t of export is equal
to zero, from which it follows that xij > x¤ij if ti 6= tj and ± <1: Q.E.D.
Steps in deriving the equilibrium tax rate
@¼ii
@ti
= 2xii
@xii
@ti
+
¡
gi ¡ ±g2i
¢ @xij
@ti
+ (xij ¡ 2±gixij) @gi@ti
@¼ji
@ti
= xji
µ
¡1
2
@xji
@ti
¡ @gj
@ti
¶
+ (pi ¡ ¿ ¡ gj)@xji@ti :
In a symmetric equilibrium we have t¤ ´ t¤A = t¤B; in which case it is optimal for
the …rms to set transfer prices equal to zero (i.e., g¤A = g¤B = 0): By di¤erentiating
equations (7) and (8) with respect to ti we …nd that @x¤ii=@tijti=tj = @x¤ji=@ti
¯¯
ti=tj
=
0: This is due to the envelope theorem: domestic sales and exports are independent
of the actual tax rates if ti = tj: Thus, a small increase in one of the tax rates from
a symmetric equilibrium will not have any e¤ect on the supplied quantities.6 The
6Di¤erentiating, we …nd @xii=@ti = ¡ (ti ¡ tj) (2 ¡ ti ¡ tj )=
h
12± (1 ¡ ti)2 (1 ¡ tj)
i
and
@xij=@ti = @xji=@ti = (ti ¡ tj ) (2 ¡ ti ¡ tj )=
h
6± (1 ¡ ti)2 (1 ¡ tj )
i
:
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changes in the pro…ts of the domestic and foreign MNCs when ti increases are
@¼¤ii
@ti
= x¤ij
@g¤i
@ti
= ¡
µ
1¡ 2¿
3
¶µ
1
2± (1¡ t¤)
¶
< 0 (26)
@¼¤ji
@ti
= ¡x¤ji
@g¤j
@ti
= ¡
µ
1¡ 2¿
3
¶ µ
1
2± (1¡ t¤)
¶
< 0:
Proof that trade cost reduction may increase the equilibrium tax rate if ® 2 (0; 1)
By di¤erentiating equation (11) with respect to ¿ we …nd
@t¤
@¿
= ¡ 6± (¿ + 1) (2 ¡ ¿ )¡
(2¡ 2¿ + 5¿ 2) ± + 3¡ 6¿ ¡ ±® (1 + ¿ )2¢2| {z }
<0
(® ¡ ®^) ;
where ®^ ´ (1 + 5¿ ¡ 5¿ 2) = ((¿ +1) (2¡ ¿ )) : Since ¿ · 1=2 we thus see that falling
trade costs (d¿ < 0) increase the equilibrium tax rate if ® > ®^: ®^ is decreasing in ¿ ;
is equal to 1=2 if ¿ = 0, and is equal to 1 if ¿ = 1: The term (® ¡ ®^) must therefore
always be negative for ® < 1=2, meaning that trade cost reduction unambiguously
reduces the equilibrium tax rate.
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